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Owning a home is often referred to as the quintessential American
dream; however, for many Americans this dream may be coming to an
end. In the coming years, approximately five million homeowners will
go through the frightening and confusing process of foreclosure.1 Since
2008, nearly four million homeowners have already been through this
horrifying experience, with some unjustly losing their homes. 2 There is
hope for the future. Changes in laws and regulations may help to
alleviate the foreclosure process, and these changes may enable many
Americans to keep the dream alive.
The foreclosure process has changed drastically over the years.
Some scholars conclude that the older procedures and standards for
conducting a foreclosure were more efficient, clear, and treated both
parties fairly; however, the modern foreclosure proceedings, varying by
state, are complicated and plagued with fraud, partly because of the
increase in popularity of the secondary mortgage market.3 In recent
years, unidentifiable entities filing foreclosure complaints were blamed
for causing many of the foreclosure confusion today. One company in
particular, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS),
once claimed to have title to nearly half of the mortgages being filed
today.4 However, oftentimes the homeowner has not entered into a

* Bryan E. Meek is a J.D. Candidate, The University of Akron School of Law, 2015. Executive
Editor of Student Writing, 2014-2015 Akron Law Review. Law Clerk for Brennan, Manna &
Diamond. CALI Awards for Excellence in Property, Criminal Procedure, and Civil Procedure. B.A.
in Political Science from The Ohio State University, 2012. The author wishes to thank the staff of
the Akron Law Review for their editorial assistance. He also wishes to thank his family for their
support during the writing of this article. Finally, the author wishes to thank Rachel Nader, Esq. and
Kenneth Mirkin, Esq. for their inspiration to write this article.
1. Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 389, 399 (2013) (stating that during this current economic crisis, nearly 1.5 million
foreclosures are being filed every year); see also Jonathan Stempel, Top Massachusetts Court Limits
Foreclosure Relief, REUTERS (June 22, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/06/22/us-massachusetts-foreclosures-idUSBRE85L18I20120622 (providing more indepth foreclosure statistics).
2. Davidson, supra note 1, at 391.
3. Id. at 413.
4. Laura A. Steven, Note, MERS and the Mortgage Crisis: Obfuscating Loan Ownership
and the Need for Clarity, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 251, 251 (2012); see also Michael
Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your Loan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/business/06mers.html7
ref=mortgageelectronicregistrationsystemsinc (providing statistics on the number of transactions in
which MERS has become involved).
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mortgage agreement with these unidentifiable entities.5
Many predicted this confusion during the early years of the crisis.6
Therefore, to combat the flawed process, some states started taking a
proactive approach by streamlining the system and increasing the
requirements for the mortgagee, while also providing defenses to the
mortgagors.7 However, too few states have made the proper changes to
the foreclosure proceeding process. With the hopes of keeping
homeowners from unjustly losing their homes, now is the time for states
that have yet to adapt to provide the needed solutions required to handle
the procedural problems.8
The primary purpose for this comment is to provide an overview of
the foreclosure process while introducing the laws and regulations that
would govern an “ideal” foreclosure system. First, it provides a general
introduction to the mortgage/foreclosure process. This introduction is
crucial; it will help many to understand the way financial institutions
have complicated the foreclosure process. Next, it analyzes various
states, labeling them as either having “strict” foreclosure laws and
regulations or having “lenient” foreclosure laws and regulations. Lastly,
this comment discusses the pros and cons of various foreclosure
requirements. The ultimate goal of this comment is to establish a set of
standards that states and courts should implement in order to provide for
a fair, efficient, and comprehensive foreclosure process. Ultimately, this
comment advocates for less stringent standing requirements, more court
involvement in the foreclosure process, and mandatory mediation.
I. THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS IN AMERICA
Before the advent of the current mortgage financing system,
homeowners enjoyed a personal relationship with their banks. The
banks, as lenders, personally managed the loan, the record keeping, and
the collection of payments.9 This relationship afforded a more defined
and efficient foreclosure process, since the original bank that financed
the home was also the bank that brought the foreclosure action.10

5. Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: the Ibanez
Time Bomb?, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 111, 118-19 (2013).
6. Gerald Korngold, Proposed Regulatory Solution: Legal and Policy Choices in the
Aftermath of the Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727, 727 (2009).
7. Davidson, supra note 1, at 399.
8. Id.
9. Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized
Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2013).
10. Id.
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Furthermore, in the event that a homeowner defaulted on a loan, the
original bank was more likely, as a result of personal incentives, to
modify the loan. This modification prevented community blight in the
towns where the banks operated, which helped the banks maintain a
positive image in the community.11
Under this former system, if an institution assigned or transferred a
note or mortgage, a county department kept records of the mortgage
transfers and assignments, allowing homeowners to easily determine
which entity owned the debt and had rights to enforce the mortgage.12
However, the downfall of this system began in the 1970s.13
When mortgage securitization and secondary mortgage markets
became popular in the late 1970s, the mortgage market abandoned the
traditional model.14 The new market developed as the “baby-boomers”
first began to purchase homes. The dramatic increase in homeownership
forced financial institutions to realize that many local banks lacked the
sufficient capital needed to fund the growing demand for home mortgage
loans.15 As a result, investment banks began bundling several mortgages
together, then issuing securities on these bundles, usually in the form of
bonds.16 These bonds represent the holder’s right “to receive certain
payments under the mortgages.”17 The security interests are then traded
as securities on the open market.18 Put simply, “securitization is the
process of utilizing mortgage loans to back investment instruments.”19
This system, in the beginning, allowed for more capital to finance the
growing demand for home loans.20 Unfortunately, this modern system,
which enabled more people to purchase homes, was one of the direct
causes of the current mortgage crisis.21

11. Id. at 1894 (discussing the ramifications for a bank in the event of default by many
homeowners). The bank was aware of the monetary consequences to the institution and was also
aware of the ramifications to the community. Id.
12. See Paul McMorrow, A New Act in Foreclosure Circus, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 14, 2011),
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2011/01/14/a_new_act_in_fore
closure_circus/ (describing a system that has been characterized as one in which financial
institutions buy, sell, and trade mortgages and promissory notes as if they were baseball cards).
13. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1896.
14. Id.
15. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1896.
16. Id.
17. Korngold, supra note 6, at 729.
18. Id.
19. Renuart, supra note 5, at 128.
20. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J.
1177, 1210 (2012).
21. Id.
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A. The Foreclosure Process
In order to understand the collapse of the housing market and the
role of the securitization process in contributing to the collapse, it is
crucial to discuss the operation of the foreclosure process. A foreclosure
is defined as a “legal proceeding to terminate a mortgagor’s interest in
property, instituted by the lender. . .either to gain title or to force a sale
in order to satisfy the unpaid debt secured by the property.”22
For a majority of the population, in order to purchase a home, one
must obtain a mortgage loan. A financial institution issues a loan to the
potential homeowner, along with an accompanying promissory note for
the loan, and a mortgage document is signed. In the event a homeowner
is unable to make payments per the terms of the note, a foreclosure
proceeding may be commenced.
Essentially, the purpose of a foreclosure is to allow the financial
institution, a mortgagee, to sell or convey the property in order to
recover money owed on the debt that was secured by the mortgage;
basically, the house is used as collateral.23 A loan in the form of a
mortgage typically consists of two documents to secure the principle
balance given to the future homeowner: a note and a security instrument
(mortgage).24 The note represents the legal obligation of the homeowner
to repay the money advanced to him or her in order to purchase the
home.25 The mortgage document represents the financial institution’s
security or collateral in the note; meaning, the mortgage “creates a
security interest in the borrower’s real property and permits the
mortgagee or beneficiary to foreclose in the event of non-payment or a
breach of other duties.”26
In most cases following the default of the note, the financial
institutions may require an acceleration of the balance of the note,
demanding the immediate payment of the remainder still owed under the
note. Depending on the jurisdiction, the financial institution may be
required to give notice of the default, usually through a foreclosure
action, prior to accelerating the balance.27 A failure to pay the remaining

22. William M. Howard, Annotation, Necessity of Production of Original Note Involved in
Mortgage Foreclosure—Twenty-First Century Cases, 86 A.L.R. 6th 411, § 2.
23. Id.
24. Renuart, supra note 5, at 131 (citing GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.27 (5th ed. 2007)).
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.03 (Michael Allan
Wolfe ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2009)).
27. Howard, supra note 22, § 3.
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balance on the note may result in the financial institution taking the
property to pay off the balance: a foreclosure.28 Typically, the party
bringing the initial foreclosure action is the one that owns the debt or
obligation.29 However, some jurisdictions allow uninterested parties,
such as a nominee mortgagee like MERS, to bring the foreclosure
action—a concept that is explored in this comment.
B. The Collapse and the Potential Causes
During the formative years of the mortgage securitization market,
the security packages were typically packaged based on a single bank’s
prime mortgages.30 However, as the demand for mortgage-backed
securities increased over time, the low-risk packages were expanded to
include not only more banks, but also sub-prime, high-risk mortgages.31
In 2006, after nine years of growth and consistent increases in home
prices,32 this growth rapidly declined.33 From 1997 to 2001, housing
appreciations stayed relatively steady at 6%.34 However, from 2001 to
2005, there was an enormous increase in appreciation rates, and by 2005,
the rates had increased beyond 12%.35 In 2007, the rates fell below zero,
the burst of the bubble.36
The theories and explanations behind this collapse are plentiful.37
Given this lack of consensus, a few of the more prominent theories shall
be noted. First, one of the more popular theories blames the increase in
demand for home ownership on the consistent increase in home prices
and the decrease in interest rates.38 As a second theory, some were quick
to blame the Community Reinvestment Act, which was passed in 1977.39

28. Id.
29. Id. § 2.
30. Korngold, supra note 6, at 730 (citing Brooke Masters & Saskia Scholtes, Payback Time,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2007, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1f7200ca-4611-11dc-b3590000779fd2ac.html#axzz3LFTMhu2K).
31. Id.
32. Davidson, supra note 1, at 397 (citing ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION:
HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 32 (1st ed.
2008)).
33. Id.at 398.
34. Levitin, supra note 21, at 1210.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1211-12 (noting that the lack of consensus is attributed to the fact that the
probability was high for multiple causes of the collapse, and it is unknown if any factor was more
relevant than others).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1214.
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While this act did not directly require financial institutions to give out an
increased number of loans, the act established a practice whereby
financial institutions were evaluated based on their ability and
willingness to serve low to moderate-income borrowers, a higher risk
group.40 As a result, banks had an incentive to provide mortgage loans to
lower income families. A third theory is that changes to the aims of the
Affordable Housing Act contributed to the collapse.41 These changes
pushed for more housing options for low-to-moderate income borrowers
as well as more housing options for underserved areas, while
encouraging “special-affordable multifamily units.”42 As a fourth theory,
one particular economist contributes the collapse to the Federal Reserve,
which allegedly kept the interest rates too low for an unwarranted period
of time; these low interest rates explain the increase in demand for
mortgages, as the interest rates allowed for cheaper mortgage credit.43
Fifth, the relaxed standards of both the securitization market and
foreclosure process may have contributed to the formation of the
mortgage/housing bubble.44 Some of these relaxed standards include
mispriced risk of mortgage credit and credit applications that did not
require strict qualification standards, partially as the result of growth of
the mortgage market due to the expansion of mortgage securitization.45
C. The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS)
The organization known as Mortgage Electronic Registration
System (MERS), adds further confusion to an already complicated
system.46 Created in 1993, MERS is a national record system;47
however, even to this day, little is known about this organization or the
ramifications of its services.48 Essentially, MERS acts as a record-keeper
that maintains a “private registry of mortgages.”49 Member institutions
that own mortgage loans designate MERS as a nominal mortgagee to a

40. Id.
41. Id. at 1218.
42. Id. at 1219 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 4562-4565 (2008)).
43. Id. at 1222 (citing JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PRO-LONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 4 (2009)).
44. Id. at 1226.
45. Id. at 1226-28.
46. Steven, supra note 4, at 251; see also Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime
Mortgage Lending, and The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359,
1378 (2010).
47. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 2009).
48. Peterson, supra note 46, at 1361.
49. Davidson, supra note 1, at 401.
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specific loan; “MERS does not originate, lend, service, or invest in home
mortgage loans.”50 It acts as a recording system that allows its members
to transfer and assign mortgage loans “without having to record each
transfer in the local land recording offices where the real estate securing
the mortgage is located.”51 This recording displays MERS as the
mortgagee, as opposed to the actual lending institute.52 The member
organizations allow MERS to record the transfers and assignments in
MERS’ system. The purpose is to increase efficiency and profitability
that occurs in each transfer.53 After a member entity registers its
mortgage transfers, MERS becomes and remains the name on the
mortgage in the public records.54
Historically, under the traditional recording system, “the originating
lender made a traditional mortgage loan by listing itself as the payee on
the promissory note and as the mortgagee on the security instrument”;
subsequently, “[t]he loan [was] then assigned to a seller for repackaging
through securitization for the investor[,]” and all transfers [were]
recorded in local offices.55 However, under the current MERS system,
the original financial institution “pays MERS a fee to record an
assignment to MERS in the county records.”56
What incentive do financial institutions have to subscribe to
MERS’ services? MERS monitors and follows each mortgage
assignment, which “‘saves lenders time and money, and reduces
paperwork, by eliminating the need to prepare and record assignments
when trading loans.”‘57 However, it is important to note that during this
process MERS never negotiates, enters into, or communicates with the
mortgagor/homeowner.58 Lastly, according to MERS itself, MERS does
not physically hold any documents for any of its subscribers, including
the mortgage document and the note.59
Equipped with a background to the mortgage system, the
50. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490.
51. Id.
52. Peterson, supra note 46, at 1361-62 (discussing how MERS will then remain as the name
on the loan for the life of the mortgage, even after assignment or transfer to another entity,
essentially making the securitization process easier).
53. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490.
54. Davidson, supra note 1, at 401.
55. Peterson, supra note 46, at 1370.
56. Id.
57. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490 (quoting MERS).
58. Id.
59. See generally Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009) (noting that
MERS is not and does not hold itself out to be the owner or holder of the mortgage documents or
promissory note documents).
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foreclosure process, and mortgage servicing entities, one may begin to
analyze a common foreclosure scenario.
II. A COMMON FORECLOSURE SCENARIO
For many Americans, the typical situation resulting in a foreclosure
process is the same: a default of the home mortgage loan under the terms
of a note. However, such a simple concept of using a lien on a home to
repay a promissory note can be filled with many nuisances and
complications. Foreclosure complaints come with various nuisances
because of the use of securitized loans and the consistent buying and
selling of a single mortgage loan. A more simplified explanation of the
concepts and principles in this comment is found in a typical foreclosure
fact scenario from a recent Ohio case.60
In 2006, two potential homeowners went to a local bank with the
intent to purchase a home, by way of a mortgage, and they were able to
obtain a mortgage worth $251,250 from Legacy Mortgage.61 The
approved homeowners signed, separately, both a promissory note and a
mortgage, which ultimately granted Legacy Mortgage a security interest
to the property.62 Therefore, the bank and homeowners entered into two
separate agreements: (1) the promissory note, with both signatures from
the homeowners and signatures from Legacy Mortgage, and (2) the
mortgage document, with both signatures from the homeowners and
signatures from Legacy Mortgage.63
Following the execution of both documents, the homeowners
obtained the necessary funding to purchase their home. 64 However,
subsequent to the signing of the promissory note and mortgage
document, Legacy Mortgage signed over the promissory note, through
an endorsement to Wells Fargo.65 Unfortunately, like many Americans
in 2008, hard times fell upon the homeowners.66 They contacted Wells
Fargo after receiving information on the default in payments, and both
contracting parties, including Wells Fargo, agreed to a short sale in an
attempt to settle the default with the bank; both parties agreed to a short
60. See generally Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St. 3d 13, 2012Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214. (This is one of the more recent cases that has come out of Ohio,
decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, where the Court decided the issue of standing when various
transfers and assignments took place under the promissory note and mortgage.)
61. Id. at ¶ 5.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at ¶ 6.
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sale in the amount of $259,900, closing in June 2009.67
About the same time the short sale contract was entered into, to the
surprise of the homeowners, a company called Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLM) filed a complaint against the
homeowners and accelerated the cost of the loan, an amount of
approximately $245,085.18.68 However, FHLM did not have a copy of
the promissory note, nor is there evidence that it was made aware of the
short sale agreement.69 After addressing this confusion with Wells
Fargo, Wells Fargo assured the homeowners that it was a technicality
and the short sale would still proceed.70
Despite this reassurance from Wells Fargo, FHLM filed a
foreclosure complaint in an Ohio court, alleging the homeowners had
defaulted on the loan and owed $245,085.18, not including the interest,
court and attorney costs, and advances.71 Along with the complaint,
FHLM attached a copy of the promissory note, which the homeowners
had originally signed, and FHLM attached a blank endorsement from
Wells Fargo and included the endorsement from Legacy Mortgage to
Wells Fargo.72 Furthermore, to make matters more confusing, Wells
Fargo officially assigned both the note and mortgage to FHLM
approximately 3 weeks after FHLM officially filed the foreclosure
complaint.73
This example shows just how complicated a foreclosure proceeding
can become when multiple notes and mortgages are transferred,
assigned, and endorsed. There are several variations and nuisances that
surround foreclosure proceedings, and this example is just a simple
variation to show some of the consequences associated with assignments
and transfers.
III. IF IT’S BROKE, FIX IT: PROBLEMS WITH THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS
As one can see from the discussion above, there are many issues
concerning the procedures involved in a foreclosure action. To recap,
some of the problems that may plague a party bringing a foreclosure
action include: whether the party has possession of one or both of the
documents associated with a mortgage loan (the note and the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
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security/mortgage document); whether the party has possession of the
proper assignment listing the true mortgagee and assignee; and whether
MERS is permitted to bring a foreclosure action in that jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, many states deal with these issues in very different ways,
causing confusion and disorganization in the foreclosure process. For
these reasons, this comment calls for a more uniform approach to deal
with foreclosures and a change to some of the necessary requirements to
bring such an action.
In order to establish which procedural aspects should be reformatted, this comment first analyzes the issues that currently
complicate the foreclosure system. It then analyzes the standards and
procedures of different states by classifying them into two categories.
The two categories are strict foreclosure requirements and lenient
foreclosure requirements, and the classifications are based on the state’s
level of scrutiny over the institutions that bring the action.
A. Problems with the Current System
1. Drawbacks of Securitization
In recent years, the securitization process, an area of law no less
complicated than many other areas of transaction law,74 has been littered
with carelessness and fraud.75 For example, in California between 2009
and 2011, 84 % of the transactions involving mortgages resulted in
documentation violations; 27 % of the documents “suggested that the
original or prior owner of the mortgage loan may not have signed the
[assignment or transfer,] and instead it was signed by an employee or
another entity; 11 percent of the time, the assignee signed as the
assignor; and, in 6 percent of the files, two or more conflicting
assignments were recorded, making it impossible for either to be legally
valid.”76
During the process of securitization, the note and the mortgage
documents often become separated, with one institution receiving the
servicing rights to the loan and the other entity receiving ownership of
74. Davidson, supra note 1, at 402.
75. Renuart, supra note 5, at 111; see also Steven, supra note 4, at 257 (citing Floyd Norris,
Some Sand in the Gears of Securitizing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/business/19norris.html) (discussing MERS engaging in
“quasi-fraudulent practices such as robo-signing”).
76. Renuart, supra note 5, at 122 (citing CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF
THE ASSESSOR-RECORDER, FORECLOSURE IN CALIFORNIA: A CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 1, 6-7
(2012)).
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the mortgage.77 The purpose for this split is to make the packaging of the
mortgages easier to securitize and trade.78 Furthermore, in an attempt to
make the securitization process more efficient, financial entities
subscribe to services that participate in acts of “robo-signing.”79
The concept of robo-signing further exemplifies problems with the
securitized mortgage market. A robo-signer is a person “who quickly
signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a month,
despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed the mortgage
documents.”80 This essentially causes carelessness in the transfer
process, whereby the proper documents are not properly signed or
included in the package being transferred.81 The problems associated
with robo-signing are so prevalent that many states stopped foreclosure
proceedings in order to investigate potential mistakes and fraud.82
2. Problems Associated with the MERS System
The MERS recording system can be criticized from many different
aspects. In fact, some attribute MERS to creating the entire secondary
mortgage market that eventually collapsed because it reduced, and
almost eliminated, the transaction costs of assigning or transferring
ownership in a mortgage.83 One criticism is that the MERS system
creates confusion amongst financial institutions because non-member
institutions are not aware of transfers between MERS members.84
Furthermore, if non-MERS institutions assign or accept assignments
from member institutions, the MERS system no longer takes control of
the assignment or maintains itself as a mortgagee of record.85 Another
77. Steven, supra note 4, at 254 (citing Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262, 263 (2009)).
78. Id.
79. For a complete explanation of robo-signing, see Renuart, supra note 5, at 124-26.
80. Renuart, supra note 5, at 125.
81. Id. (analyzing One West Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859-69 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2010)); see also Gloria J. Liddell & Pearson Liddell, Jr., The Legal Quagmire of Invalid
Residential Foreclosure Proceedings and the Resultant Potential Impact upon Stakeholders, 16
CHAP. L. REV. 367, 384 (2013) (noting that “with this high volume of new loan originators and 8.1
million potential foreclosures, coupled with tens of millions of unrecorded assignments, it is a small
wonder that MERS, and mortgage service companies in the name of MERS, had to resort to an
assembly line process whereby agents of MERS signed affidavits regarding the propriety of
foreclosure documentation without reviewing the loan file”).
82. Renuart, supra note 5, at 126.
83. Davidson, supra note 1, at 401 (MERS has a role in six out of ten mortgage loans in the
United States); see also Brett J. Natarelli & James M. Golden, The End of the Beginning in the
Battle Over MERS, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 400, 401 (2011).
84. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn. 2009).
85. Id.
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criticism is that in instances where documentation may be necessary for
an assignment or transfer, MERS does not draft or handle the
documentation maintenance of non-MERS members; instead, MERS
encourages the member financial institutions to have an officer become
MERS certified, with the authority to sign documents on behalf of
MERS, allowing the documents to remain in MERS’ name.86
Another criticism is that MERS assumes the role as a party
conducting foreclosure.87 In these instances courts have to determine
whether MERS has standing to bring a foreclosure action against a
homeowner.88 The reason for the confusion is three-fold. First, MERS
does not loan money to the homeowner and no money comes from
MERS to be applied to the loan principal.89 Second, the homeowner
never promised to pay MERS any money, including payments on the
note, and MERS is not entitled to collect the monthly payments.90 Third,
MERS does not receive any of the money collected at the conclusion of
a foreclosure sale; these funds go to the mortgagee that actually owns the
note.91
Federal courts have established a three-part test to determine
standing: (1) an injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.92
When applying this test to MERS, one can clearly see that it may lack
standing. MERS has no right to receive payments under the contract, nor
should it expect to receive payments from the homeowners; in fact,
MERS “makes the same amount of money with respect to the original
mortgage agreement whether the borrower repays or not.”93 MERS’
label as a “nominal mortgagee” does not provide it with an actual injury,
thus it may lack standing to bring the foreclosure action; however, some
states do consider MERS as having standing.94
Under the traditional standing requirements, MERS would not have
standing to bring a foreclosure action in court. However, given that some
states allow courts to grant MERS standing, MERS has apparently been
granted a “pass” on traditional standing requirements. The concern over
MERS’ ability to sue has diminished over the last few years, however, as
86. Id.
87. Peterson, supra note 46, at 1377-78.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1377.
90. Id. at 1378.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1381 (analyzing Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269,
273-74 (2008)).
93. Id. at 1381-82.
94. Id. at 1382.
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MERS’ has adopted a policy of no longer bringing foreclosure actions.95
MERS creates more confusion for homeowners by failing to notify
the mortgagors “when ownership of [the mortgage] changes hands.”96
Thus, one of the major issues addressed below in terms of state
classification, is how the state’s rules and regulations govern MERS and
its ability to notify and bring foreclosure complaints against
homeowners.97 The lack of disclosure to homeowners creates confusion
when the homeowner goes to her financial institution to re-negotiate a
loan or to enforce a legal right and is unable to learn the true identity of
the title holder.98
Furthermore, as a result of MERS’ involvement with the splitting of
mortgage documents, multiple owners have interests in a homeowner’s
property; therefore, “it may be unclear who has the authority to modify
the instrument and arrive at a workout of a troubled loan with the
borrower.”99 Essentially, the public records for assignments are no
longer updated to contain the most current information a homeowner
may need when determining who has an interest in the note or mortgage.
In fact, if MERS is expanded to encompass all financial organizations,
local record departments that manage assignments will be rendered
useless.100
Despite the potential negative consequences of mortgagee
nominees, such as MERS, financial institutions have two incentives to
utilize their services. First, the services make the initial recordings and
subsequent assignment transfers easier to record in the county offices,101
allowing the institutions to lower recording costs.102 Second, in some
jurisdictions, financial institutions are able to allow MERS to bring the
foreclosure proceedings, thus preventing a bank from having to assume
the responsibility of maintaining a foreclosure action.103
Even with these incentives, it is important for legislatures and
95. Id.
96. Steven, supra note 4, at 256 (citing Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic
Registration System, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262, 264).
97. Id. (the author is noting that “state laws take disparate views on MERS’s standing to
foreclose,” especially after analyzing U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 54 (Mass.
2011) and Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Minn. 2009)).
98. Korngold, supra note 6, at 744.
99. Id. at 746 (citing Gretchen Morgenson, Work Out Problems with Lenders? Try to Find
Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at A14).
100. Id. at 744.
101. Peterson, supra note 46, at 1362.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2185, 2208-12 (2007).
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courts to put an end to the carelessness and fraud that has littered the
mortgage securitization system, a system blamed for causing the market
collapse.104 Determining the rules and procedures for a more adequate,
efficient, and fair foreclosure process is not an easy task. And, in
correcting the system, it is important to remember that there are major
economic consequences when corrective actions are taken; these
changes must not put further strain on markets or their operations.105
B. State Classifications
States that institute strict foreclosure requirements and regulations
afford the most protection to the homeowners and put the biggest burden
on the financial institutions that bring the foreclosure actions. However,
other states take a more lenient approach by having less stringent
standards and requirements.
1. Strict Standing Requirements
One of the first factors to consider when determining a state’s
classification is to look at the state’s standing requirements.
The first state to consider when looking at the requirements for
standing is Massachusetts. In a recent decision, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that, at the time a foreclosure action is
commenced, the mortgage document must specifically identify the
mortgage holder, essentially disallowing blank assignments of
mortgages without direct proof of the assignment.106 Under this ruling,
MERS is not permitted to bring a blank assignment of a mortgage in
Massachusetts. Furthermore, the owner of a mortgage must clearly
identify itself as the owner of the note prior to bringing a foreclosure
complaint.107
Another state to consider is New Jersey, where the Superior Court
made a similar finding to Massachusetts. The court held that “MERS, as
a nominee, does not have any real interest in the underlying debt, or the
104. Korngold, supra note 6, at 739.
105. Id. at 732.
106. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53 (Mass. 2011); see also Steven, supra
note 4, at 258 (explaining that “where a mortgage note is blank and does not list the owner of the
mortgage, a foreclosure cannot proceed under Ibanez”).
107. Steven, supra note 4, at 259 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. TIT. 3, § 244 (2011)). Other
states to consider include Oregon and Idaho. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.752 (renumbered from
86.735 in 2013 by the Legislative Council) (requiring recording of all transfers of the loan); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §45-1505(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Second Reg. Sess. of the 62nd Idaho
Leg.) (requiring all assignments to be recorded in the counties where the property is located).
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mortgage which secured that debt. It acts simply as an agent or ‘straw
man’ for the lender.”108 Thus, without the proper interest, MERS lacks
standing to bring the foreclosure complaint in New Jersey.109 If an
institution attempting to bring a foreclosure complaint is not the original
mortgagee on the mortgage document, it must prove the entire chain-oftitle, establishing how it came into interest of the note and mortgage,
similar to Massachusetts.110 Lastly, New Jersey requires the party
bringing the foreclosure action to have the actual note in its possession,
while possession of the mortgage document is optional.111
New York has taken a similar approach as New Jersey. New York
requires the financial institutions to submit both the original note and
evidence of assignments in order to establish that it has standing to bring
the foreclosure action.112
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has also held that MERS does not
have any interest in the mortgages it services and, at the most, “[MERS
is the] mere agent of the lender [it services].”113 Thus, MERS does not
have standing in Arkansas to bring an action for foreclosure.114
Ohio has established that a party attempting to bring a foreclosure
complaint needs only the mortgage/security document or the original
note; however, a party cannot acquire standing subsequent to filing the
foreclosure by receiving the original note after the filing of the
complaint.115 Thus, the party needs to ensure that it has standing prior to
108. Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010).
109. Howard, supra note 22, § 4 (noting that “a party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must
own or control the underlying debt”).
110. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d at 452, 455 (noting rule 4:64-1(b)(10) and that dismissal is
appropriate in cases where the Plaintiff is unable to establish standing to bring the foreclosure
complaint).
111. Id. at 455, 458.
112. Howard, supra note 22, § 4 (where the authority conducted an analysis of New York laws
analyzed in In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) and 627 Acquisition Co., LLC v. 627
Greenwich, LLC, 927 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)). However, in Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. v. Coakley, the court allowed MERS to bring a foreclosure action as long
as it held both the Note and the Mortgage at the time of commencement. Mortg. Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 838 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). Therefore, MERS has
more leniency in New York.
113. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Southwest Homes of Arkansas, 2009 Ark. 152, at 1-3,
301 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (using the reasoning that “no payments on the underlying debt were ever made to
MERS. MERS did not service the loan in any way. It did not oversee payments, delinquency of
payments, or administration of the loan in any way.”).
114. Id. at 7-8, 301 S.W.3d at 5.
115. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St. 3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017,
979 N.E.2d 1214, at ¶ 3 (this case was a landmark decision for Ohio in which the Supreme Court of
Ohio determined whether a party could acquire standing subsequent to filing the foreclosure
complaint). This new ruling in Ohio provides a more lenient approach than that decided in In re
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bringing the action in Ohio.116
Florida, like Ohio, only requires possession of the original note to
have standing to bring a foreclosure action.117 Florida, however, does
allow notes to be indorsed in blank, meaning no chain of title or
assignment is needed.118 Furthermore, as in Ohio, the plaintiff in Florida
must prove, at the time of filing the complaint, that it had standing to
sue; meaning, lack of standing cannot be cured after the initial filing of
the complaint.119
2. Lenient Standing Requirements
While some states take a strict stance by having more requirements
for financial institutions, other states take the opposite approach. For
example, Minnesota does not require assignments to be recorded; thus,
MERS’ procedure of only recording assignments within its personal
system is valid.120 Furthermore, Minnesota allows organizations such as
MERS to enforce the note when bringing a foreclosure action, as long as
it is acting as a nominee or agent.121
Some states go as far as to allow MERS to always foreclose on
mortgages. For example, in Nevada, MERS may foreclose on a
residential property under the reasoning that the initial financial
institution and MERS entered into an agency relationship whereby the
institution gave MERS the most leeway in terms of its actions.122
However, by Nevada requiring the presence of both documents, the
homeowner will at least know the true identity of the party that has

Foreclosure Cases. In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (analyzing
Ohio law and deciding that the party attempting to establish standing must have both the mortgage
document and the note in its possession).
116. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017 at ¶ 3.
117. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Knight, 90 So. 3d 824, 826 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2012); see also
McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 170, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(noting that if the “note does not name the plaintiff as the payee, the note must bear a special
endorsement in favor of the plaintiff or a blank endorsement”).
118. Knight, 90 So. 3d at 826.
119. McLean, 79 So. 3d at 172; see also Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. McGrath Cmty.
Chiropractic, 913 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
120. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 489-90 (Minn. 2009)
(holding that “transfers of the underlying indebtedness do not have to be recorded to foreclose a
mortgage”).
121. MINN. STAT. ANN. §507.413 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014 Reg. Sess.).
122. Smith v. Cmty. Lending, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (D. Nev. 2011) (where the court
used the reasoning that “[a]lthough MERS is not in fact the beneficiary, the attempt to name it as
such coupled with the [language of the agreement] . . . indicates an intent to give MERS the
broadest possible agency on behalf of the owner of the beneficial interest in the underlying debt”).
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ownership of the debt, instead of it just listing “MERS.”123
The state of Florida has some of the most relaxed laws when it
comes to standing. Under Florida statutory provisions, any person or
entity can enforce a note or mortgage instrument, even if it is not the
owner of the instrument or does not have possession of the instrument,
as long as it is allowed to enforce the document pursuant to other
provisions.124 Furthermore, a party who is in wrongful possession of the
instrument can still enforce it as long as the party has possession of the
instrument.125
Kansas is similar to Florida in terms of leniency. In order to
respond to MERS specifically, Kansas developed a statute just dealing
with nominees and the enforcement of security interests.126 The courts in
Kansas have also started to interpret MERS standing arguments more
favorably towards MERS. For instance, MERS is now able to bring a
foreclosure action in Kansas against a property owner on behalf of the
mortgagee for which they are an agent or nominee.127 However, in a
subsequent decision, it was determined that the nominee could only
bring a foreclosure action if it is indicated to the nominee from the
mortgagee that it should be granted with this power, a partial limitation
on the previous decision.128

123. Peterson, supra note 46, at 1361-62.
124. Steven, supra note 4, at 262.
125. Steven, supra note 4, at 262-63 (analyzing §673.3011 of the Florida Code); see also
Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2013) (analyzing Texas law
and generally holding that MERS is not required to hold the note in order to foreclose). North
Carolina even allows the financial institution to submit only a photo-copy of the original note; it
never has to provide or prove actual possession of the original note that was filed. Courts have
allowed these photo-copies without proof or establishment that they are replicas of the original. See
Howard, supra note 22, § 5 (citing Dobson v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 711 S.E.2d 728 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2011)) see also Gallant v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 721 (W.D. Va.
2011) (applying Virginia law) (court generally noted that the mortgagee did not have to produce or
insert into record the original note in order to be entitled to foreclose on a property).
126. Steven, supra note 4, at 263 (noting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-219 (West 2011), which
reads that “[i]n an action in which any relief is sought would determine title or affect a security
interest in real property, a person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party if the
person is a nominee of record on behalf of a beneficial owner of a claimed interest in the property
that is the subject of the action. The nominee need not be a party required to be joined under
subsection (a)(1).”)).
127. Martinez v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (In re Martinez), 444 B.R. 192, 204-05
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2011).
128. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Howie, 280 P.3d 225, 226-27 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (the court noted
that “[g]enerally, a mortgage is unenforceable when it is not held by the same entity that holds the
promissory note. However, an exception exists where there is an agency relationship between the
holder of the mortgage and the holder of the promissory note.”). Essentially, the note and the
mortgage are not split if both the mortgagee and the mortgagee’s nominee hold them.
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3. Judicial v. Non-Judicial Foreclosure Proceedings
States can also be classified by the amount of judicial oversight the
state requires in the foreclosure process. States that allow financial
institutions to foreclose on a property with little judicial oversight are
said to be “non-judicial foreclosure” states.129 Essentially, in a nonjudicial foreclosure state, the financial institutions exercise the power of
sale that is included as a provision in the mortgage document without
first consulting with the courts.130 States that allow non-judicial
foreclosures possess a lenient classification. This is obviously in contrast
to a “judicial foreclosure” state where the foreclosure is initiated by a
complaint for foreclosure filed with the court, directly involving the
court and its procedures.131 States mandating judicial foreclosures have a
strict classification when it comes to the formal procedures of the
foreclosure process. Currently, a little over half of the states use nonjudicial methods when conducting foreclosures, thus making them more
common than one may perceive.132
In states that operate a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding, the
homeowner, in order to apply the strict standards of proof, files an
injunction with the court in order to stop or delay the non-judicial
foreclosure; the injunction must specify the legal claims and defenses
argued by the homeowner.133 For classification purposes, these nonjudicial foreclosure states would be listed under the “lenient” category if
it were not for these states’ strict standards of proof that the homeowner
can invoke in order to stay the foreclosure sale.
Minnesota is an ideal example of a state that allows non-judicial
foreclosure sales.134 In Minnesota, a financial institution can foreclose on
129. Renuart, supra note 5, at 111.
130. Id. at 140 (citing John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Foreclosing a Dream: State Laws Deprive
Homeowners of Basic Protections, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, Feb. 2009, at 11, available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf).
131. Id. at 139 (citing JOHN RAO et al., FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES, WORKOUTS AND
MORTGAGE SERVICING § 4.2.3 at 105, § 4.2.4 at 106 (National Consumer Law Center 3d ed.
2010)). Also, currently 22 states use judicial foreclosure proceedings: Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont and Wisconsin. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, JUDICIAL VERSUS NON-JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE,
available
at
http://www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/ForeclosureProcess/JudicialVersusNonJudicialForeclosure.pdf.
132. Renuart, supra note 5, at 139.
133. Renuart, supra note 5, at 141.
134. Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Minn. 2009) (analyzing
§ 580.02 and § 580.04 of the Minnesota Code).
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any property as long as there is not a current action to recover on the
note already established, all recording and assignment measures have
been met, and the institution has complied with all notice requirements
under §580.04 of the Minnesota Code.135 Furthermore, if an institution
fails to comply with any of these requirements, the sale is void.136
Some states, such as Massachusetts, place stricter standards on
financial institutions when establishing standing prior to bringing a
complaint for a foreclosure, but some states still allow for non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings.137 Like Minnesota, Massachusetts also
establishes that the mortgagor can stay the foreclosure proceeding by
raising proper defenses and obtaining a declaration from the court.138
However, the homeowner is still able to challenge the sale subsequent to
the auction/sale by requesting that the proper title to the property be
called into question.139 For example, where there is a lack of standing
and proper title is found to be void, the sale is also voided.140 Obviously,
many other states allow these non-judicial foreclosures; however, each
state may differ on procedures and standards the financial institution
must follow when initiating a foreclosure.
4. ADR Requirements
Another way of classifying a state’s foreclosure laws is to analyze
any sort of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques that the
courts or statutes implement prior to the foreclosure sale. The use of
ADR during the foreclosure process has the potential of saving more
homes from going to sale and also benefits the financial institutions by
allowing them to more easily recoup some of their losses. As millions of
Americans continue to lose their homes to foreclosure, such alternatives
may keep people in their homes.141 Furthermore, the use of ADR helps

135. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 580.02, 580.04 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014 Reg.
Sess.).
136. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 494; see also Moore v. Carlson, 128 N.W. 578, 579 (Minn.
1910).
137. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49 (Mass. 2011) (noting that there is a
statutory power of sale for mortgage holders to foreclose without a judicial authorization).
138. Id.; see also Beaton v. Land Ct., 326 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass. 1975). Interestingly,
Massachusetts is also a foreclosure by entry state, where the mortgage holder may peaceably enter a
property subsequent to a recording of a certificate noting the entry by foreclosure. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 244, §§ 1-2 (2011).
139. Renuart, supra note 5, at 148-49 (analyzing Novastar Mortg., Inc. v. Saffran, 948 N.E.2d
917 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011)).
140. Id.
141. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1889.
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ensure that only the necessary foreclosure sales occur, which may, in
result, help stabilize the economy once again.142
The ADR process works by requiring the homeowners to sit down
and discuss the mortgage and delinquent payments with the financial
institutions.143 By requiring ADR, courts are essentially forcing the
financial institutions to weigh and consider the benefits of a sale against
the potential benefits of allowing the homeowner to remain in the home
and make reduced payments.144 Such a process may be particularly
helpful in areas with a poor housing market where it may be difficult to
re-sell a home and recoup the amount on the note.
Clear objectives for the ADR meetings are required in order to
ensure success. In fact, one author has very clearly laid out five
objectives that should be followed in the process. First, the ADR process
should be used to facilitate more clear communication that may have
otherwise been inhibited because of the confusion in the securitization
process.145 Second, the ADR process should “provide oversight of the
loan servicers’ conduct” by the courts.146 Third, the process should allow
the courts to educate homeowners about their rights during the
process.147 Fourth, it should allow the courts to better manage a docket
littered with foreclosure complaints, especially in areas with judicial
foreclosure proceedings.148 Fifth, the process allows the courts to
manage the image of the community by allowing more homes to be
occupied.149
Oftentimes, however, in order for the ADR process to be
successful, the foreclosure complaint must be stayed or removed from
active docket because it is counter-intuitive to allow a financial
institution to continue with a foreclosure while at the same time
negotiating alternatives.150 Alternative resolutions may in fact help more
homeowners stay in their homes, while still allowing the financial
institutions to recoup some of their losses under the default.

142. Id. at 1908. For an example of a statutory requirement for mediation, see Vermont’s
statute regarding “Opportunity to Mediate.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4632 (2013).
143. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1908.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1909.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1924.
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C. Some Courts Still Remain Undecided
Some states have yet to set standards concerning some aspects of
the foreclosure process; for example, standards on who may bring a
foreclosure action or what requirements will be used for standing.151
Therefore, it is crucial to outline the positives and negatives of every
aspect of the process while guiding the undecided states, and all others,
towards a more uniform system that treats the financial institutions and
the homeowners with equality.
The state of Michigan still remains uncertain, even after various
court rulings. An intermediate court voided non-judicial foreclosures
that were brought by MERS under the state law that requires the “owner
of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage” to foreclose.152 However, subsequent to this decision, the
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that record titleholders, such as MERS,
were included under the part of the statute that states the “owner. . .of an
interest in the indebtedness” may also foreclose on a property.153 This
decision overruled a previous Michigan Supreme Court decision, which
interpreted a person owning an interest in the note to mean a party
receiving payments under the terms of the note.154 These two decisions
came only seven months apart.155
D. Negative Aspects of Various Rules and Regulations
This comment now analyzes the pros and cons of the rules and
regulations outlined above and then develops an ideal foreclosure
process that embraces efficiency, reliability, and fairness.
1. Judicial Foreclosure
Even the judicial oversight procedures, some of the concepts
discussed above, carry inefficiencies and unfairness towards a
homeowner. For example, when a foreclosure goes through a formal
judicial proceeding, the process may be slow and cumbersome.This may
cause a negative impact on the communities, especially when
151. See Natarelli & Golden, supra note 83, at 405.
152. Id. at 403 (analyzing § 600.3204(1)(d) of the Michigan Code).
153. Residential Funding Co., L.L.C. v. Saurman (Saurman II), 805 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Mich.
2011).
154. Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman (Saurman I), 807 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App.
2011).
155. Saurman II, 805 N.W.2d 183 (decided Nov. 16, 2011); Saurman I, 807 N.W.2d 412
(decided Oct. 7, 2010).
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foreclosures become back-logged and homes sit empty. If the process
was performed in a more expedited and efficient manner, homes may fill
more quickly, preventing community blight.156 Furthermore, judicial
foreclosure proceedings are extremely inefficient economically, both for
the homeowner and for the financial institution.157
It is important, however, to weigh all of the negative aspects of a
judicial foreclosure proceeding against the negative aspects of a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding.
2. Non-Judicial Foreclosure
After analyzing some of the drawbacks of a judicial foreclosure
proceeding, the non-judicial foreclosures may seem more efficient;
however, such a procedure has just as many, if not more, drawbacks than
the judicial proceeding.158 First, without the oversight of a decree by a
judicial officer, titles to property sold improperly may have to be voided,
causing great confusion for subsequent purchasers of the property; such
a problem may also lead to increases in title insurance for homeowners,
especially when purchasing foreclosed homes.159
Second, non-judicial foreclosures tend to be more friendly to the
lenders and financial institutions than to the homeowners. Essentially,
the procedure is set in motion and completed very quickly and puts
pressure on the homeowners to slow down or challenge the process.160

156. See Renuart, supra note 5, at 174 (further discussing the possible national ramifications
of delayed foreclosures in terms of the securitization process and the market activity as a whole).
One particular article estimates that homeowners surrounding a vacant, foreclosed home will lose
approximately $1,508 due to a decrease in their home value, while the local community
governments will lose approximately $19,227 through a loss in taxes and fees, along with a
shrinking tax base due to lower priced homes. Glenn Setzer, Foreclosures Cost Lenders,
Homeowners, the Community Big Bucks, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (June 2, 2008, 7:00 AM),
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/622008_Foreclosure_Costs.asp.
157. See Setzer, supra note 156 (noting that the average foreclosure costs financial institutions
approximately $77,935; furthermore, the cost of preventing a foreclosure will cost the homeowner
approximately $3,300).
158. One state in particular, Hawaii, has noticed these drawbacks and has eliminated many
uses of non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. See Everett S. Kaneshige & Seth J. Corpuz-Lahne, The
New Foreclosure Law, 16 HAW. B. J. 4, 5 (2012).
159. Renuart, supra note 5, at 174. Such a concept may also require states to adopt or change
laws concerning subsequent bonafide purchasers. In one particular case, Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court voided a foreclosure sale to a subsequent purchaser, thus
removing the homeowner from the home, and the homeowner could not acquire good title.
Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 897 (Mass. 2011). For a more detailed article on the nonjudicial affects in Massachusetts, see McMorrow, supra note 12.
160. Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial
Foreclosure States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 344-45 (2011).
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Such challenges require swift action by the homeowner, who may not
even be aware of the options they have; furthermore, it places even more
financial strain on the homeowner by requiring one to seek immediate
legal counsel and advice, as opposed to working directly with a judge
through a formal foreclosure proceeding.161 Swift action may eliminate
options for non-foreclosure remedies, such as solutions through
mediation.
Third, the non-judicial proceeding may not be as friendly to the
lender as some may first perceive. Pursuing an action through a nonjudicial proceeding may prevent the financial institutions from pursuing
claims after the foreclosure sale, for example, by obtaining a declaration
on a deficiency judgment.162 So while the efficiency and reduced cost of
bringing a foreclosure under non-judicial proceedings seems lucrative at
first, the popularity of such proceedings may be decreasing.163
3. Securitization and MERS
Some believe that courts are not keeping up with changing times,
especially regarding the mortgage securitization process.164 These parties
are quick to point out the ineffectiveness of requiring the party-ininterest to bring a foreclosure complaint.165 These parties base their
argument around a few concepts. First, the promissory note, or the right
to enforce the promissory note, needs to transfer with the mortgage
document because a transfer of a mortgage without the right to enforce
the note is a nullity.166 Furthermore, some argue that the rule is pointless
because the promissory note could simply be transferred on the eve of
trial through a blank assignment.167 In instances where a financial
institution issues a servicer, such as MERS, the servicer technically does
not have an interest in the promissory note, i.e. it is not the real party-ininterest; however, these financial institutions are granting the servicers

161. Id. (providing a further explanation of ways non-judicial foreclosure states are attempting
to reduce foreclosures, even with the relaxed procedure rules and regulations).
162. Id. at 349.
163. Renuart, supra note 5, at 179-80 (discussing how states are starting to re-examine nonjudicial foreclosures).
164. See Korngold, supra note 6, at 727 (indicating the constant changes occurring among
financial entities).
165. See Natarelli & Golden, supra note 83, at 402-03 (discussing how there are no real
problems when splitting the note).
166. Id. at 402 (providing the reason Arizona and California will “allow for a party on both
ends of the ‘split’ to foreclose”).
167. Id.
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the right to foreclose on behalf of the real party-in-interest.168 Also,
while the banks have sufficient information concerning who has an
interest in each mortgage and promissory note because of the rise of
document records, local filing offices may not have updated records that
establish who is the proper party-in-interest.169 In addition, such a rule
prevents an efficient foreclosure process, and it requires more time and
money to sort through the complicated transfers and assignments when
the original intent was to give the nominee or representative agency the
power to bring the foreclosure.170
A possible consequence of failing to require parties to prove an
interest or that it is the proper party to bring the foreclosure action is that
people may obtain free homes without any obligation to pay the debt
owed on the home.171 This is a result of rules such as Ohio’s two
dismissal rule, where essentially if there are two dismissals (either with
or without prejudice) the same claim cannot be re-filed a third time.172
4. ADR
While mediation does seem like an advantageous alternative to a
foreclosure proceeding, it does have its drawbacks. First, it does not
make sense to have a financial institution engaged in mediation talks
while at the same time advocating for the foreclosure of the property,
because the time and resources will still be spent on the ultimate
solution: foreclosure.173 The constant re-submitting and upkeep of
168. Foreclosure: Fifth Circuit Issues Important Wins for Lenders, 43 REAL EST. L. REP. 1, 2
(Aug. 2013). The Fifth Circuit came to this conclusion after analyzing Martins v. BAC Home Loans
Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2013).
169. Korngold, supra note 6, at 744.
170. See Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 63 CONSUMER
FIN. L. Q. REP. 262, 273-74 (2009).
171. See W.W. Allen, Annotation, What Dismissals Preclude a Further Suit, Under Federal
and State Rules Regarding Two Dismissals, 65 A.L.R.2d 642, § 1 (1959) (discussing Ohio’s “two
dismissal rule” found under Ohio Civ. R. 41(A)(1) and how it pertains to private foreclosure
actions).
172. Id.
173. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1924; see also Natarelli & Golden, supra note 83, at 405
(noting that “[m]uch of the law regarding MERS, and foreclosure standing generally, is still unclear
outside of major foreclosure states (e.g., Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio)”); Peterson, supra note 46,
at 1361 (noting that “virtually no academic attention has been paid to the one particular company
that has been a party in more subprime mortgage loans than any other[,]” referring to MERS); John
P. Hunt, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Rebalancing Public and Private In the Law of
Mortgage Transfer, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 1529, 1533 (2013) (noting that “in many states it is unclear
whether a mortgage buyer must record its interest in order to ensure that its ownership interest in the
mortgage is protected from subsequent claimants”). The article also goes on to point out that in
many states there can be a conflict between the requirements under real-property law and the state’s
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financial packets and financial documents may put too much of a burden
on the homeowner.174 Furthermore, mediation can delay what is only the
inevitable: foreclosure of the property.175 Lastly, mediation programs
may increase the attorney’s fees that the homeowner will ultimately have
to pay to the financial institution upon completion of the procedure,
whether that completion is by settlement through a loan modification or
collection on the foreclosed property.176
E. Positive Aspects of Various Rules and Regulations
While some procedures, rules, and other aspects of state foreclosure
proceedings put the homeowner at a great disadvantage, some actually
create fairness and uniformity. This section analyzes some of the
positive aspects of various laws and court rules.
1. Non-Judicial Foreclosure
First, concerning the use of non-judicial foreclosures, one may
easily see why some jurisdictions utilize this procedure.177 The use of
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings essentially provides a process that
is “quicker, easier, and [a] less costly method to repossess a borrower’s
home [compared to a judicial proceeding].”178 While foreclosure
proceedings that require judicial decrees could ultimately take years to
go through the court, non-judicial foreclosure proceedings can conclude
in 20 to 120 days, depending on the jurisdiction and the statutory
language governing the proceeding.179 Also, the use of non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings allows for the use of “self-policing” complaints,
whereby the foreclosing party must ensure that they are the proper
holder and owner of the note and mortgage; failure to do so could result
in the foreclosure being overturned, benefiting the homeowner.180
version of Article 9. Id. at 1561.
174. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1924-25.
175. Id. at 1925.
176. Id. at 1919-20 (noting that even without attorneys, the mandating of ADR will still be
beneficial to both parties).
177. An example is the state of Massachusetts, where the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled on
the admissibility of statutory foreclosures that do not require a judicial decree. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49 (Mass. 2011).
178. Renuart, supra note 5, at 171.
179. Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending the
Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud or Unfairness, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139,
150-51 (2006).
180. Renuart, supra note 5, at 173. Also, a homeowner who is able to establish that he or she
has been wrongfully foreclosed upon may have a tort action against the foreclosing entity. See
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Furthermore, some states allow non-judicial foreclosures with the
reason that homeowners are still provided a remedy in the event that
there are questions as to true ownership of the promissory note and
mortgage. For example, one of the most common remedies is for a
mortgagor to file an action with the court that enjoins the foreclosure and
allows the process to become a judicial foreclosure, thus allowing the
court to have oversight.181
2. Securitization and MERS
Second, there are positive aspects to allowing MERS to manage
mortgage documents and bring foreclosure actions. MERS enables
mortgagees to keep recordings, assignments, and history of transfers in
one location, and this is especially convenient in instances where the
loan or promissory note is sold and the mortgagee still retains the right
to be a servicer of the mortgage; such situations create a nightmare when
it comes to recording of interests, assignments, and transfers.182 This
system saves the mortgage industry and the financial institutions
millions of dollars each year that would be accrued through recording
fees and other general processing fees.183 Furthermore, the system works
because the mortgage on record with each county does not need to be
changed to reflect each subsequent assignment and transfer; MERS
remains as the mortgagee on record with the county.184 Furthermore,
MERS is able to help reduce mortgage fraud by cross-referencing
information, which eliminates multiple loans being issued for the same
property.185
Many states still require the real party-in-interest to bring a
foreclosure complaint.186 Such a requirement can provide major
advantages to both the courts and the homeowners. First, such a rule
insures that the money owed is going directly to the party entitled to

James L. Buchwalter, Cause of Action in Tort for Wrongful Foreclosure of Residential Mortgage,
52 CAUSES ACTION 2d 119, §1 (2012).
181. See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 49 (analyzing Beaton v. Land Ct., 326 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass.
1975)).
182. Phillips, supra note 170, at 263.
183. Id.
184. Id. For a further explanation concerning the ease with which MERS is able to record
documents, see Alvin C. Harrell, Teaching Consumer Law: Part Four, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L.
8 (2008).
185. Phillips, supra note 170, at 264. For more information concerning mortgage fraud as a
growing problem in America, see Therese G. Franzén, Update on Mortgage Fraud—What is
Happening Today?, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 14 (2008).
186. See supra Part III.A.1.
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receive the money owed, e.g. the owner of the debt/obligation.187 Such a
requirement also prevents two parties from laying claim to the debt or
obligation, an issue that is easily foreseen due to the constant barrage of
trading, buying, and selling of mortgages and promissory notes.188
Lastly, by requiring the real party-in-interest to bring the action, courts
are essentially requiring financial institutions to prove the true title or
chain of assignment, ensuring all parties are properly represented.189
Such a rule also requires transparency among all of the financial
institutions, which encourages them to keep proper records and transfer
the actual documents.190 Another reason for this requirement is that it
helps establish a uniform system for all financial institutions to follow,
which is extremely convenient given the current state of confusion
surrounding whether nominees are able to bring foreclosure actions.191
Also, by having such a requirement, courts are not shielding the
financial institutions from liability for tortious actions such as predatory
loan practices.192
3. ADR
Mediation can also be a great tool for courts to utilize; even states
utilizing non-judicial foreclosures may still be able to enforce some sort
of mediation requirement. Essentially, mediation brings both parties to
the table and establishes communication between the borrowers and the
financial institutions.193 Such communication allows for the two parties
to consider whether foreclosure is the best route for the homeowner; for
example, there may be instances where the homeowner is re-employed
and the bank is able to obtain some sort of payment and keep the
homeowner in the home.194 It is also during this time that the
187. Howard, supra note 22, § 2. However, the constant struggle comes in when courts are
trying to balance the benefits and popularity of the securitization market, while at the same time,
trying to maintain the formality that should be required when determining if someone should be
removed from their homes due to a mortgage default. See Davidson, supra note 1, at 394.
188. Theoretically, if courts did not have this rule then “there would be a possibility that after
a foreclosure the true owner of the loan could come forward rightfully seeking foreclosure on its
interest and subject the homeowner to [a double jeopardy concept] . . . making the homeowner pay
twice.” Timothy A. Froehle, Note, Standing in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Why Procedural
Requirements are Necessary to Prevent Further Loss to Homeowners, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1719, 1731
(2011).
189. Id. at 1734.
190. Korngold, supra note 6, at 746.
191. See Davidson, supra note 1, at 408-09.
192. See Phillips, supra note 170, at 264.
193. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1901.
194. Id. at 1908.
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homeowners, courts, and even the institutions themselves can discover if
the party bringing the foreclosure action truly has standing, thus saving
time down the litigation road.195 ADR also encourages settlement, thus
reducing court docket overload in the hardest hit areas.196 Lastly,
community blight and economic stress would decrease because the
system would keep more people in their homes through the use of loan
modifications and other settlement resolutions.197
F. What Does the Ideal System Look Like?
After a thorough analysis of the foreclosure process; the way
different aspects of the system, such as large nominee firms like MERS,
have changed the system; and advantages and disadvantages of various
rules and regulations of the foreclosure process, this comment now
provides a concept of what the ideal foreclosure process would look like
within a uniform system.
It has been said that “[l]aw is not endogenous; it grows in response
to the pressures exerted upon it and, as Justice Holmes argued, is shaped
less by any inherent logic and more by the accretion of experience.”198
After five to six years of a continuous mortgage crisis, should we return
to a more formalistic foreclosure proceeding?199 In some regards, this
comment advocates for the foreclosure system to return to a more formal
system.
1. Formal Judicial Foreclosure System
First, the foreclosure system needs to return to formal judicial
proceedings by eliminating the use of non-judicial foreclosures. The
judicial system provides the most fairness to both parties. Financial
institutions under the judicial system can avoid post-resolution issues
and ensure any judgments or money owed by the homeowner can still
be collected post-foreclosure.200 As noted above, there is uncertainty in
some jurisdictions as to whether financial institutions can collect on
loans that were foreclosed under non-judicial foreclosures.201
Furthermore, a foreclosure conducted under a judicial proceeding will

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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Id. at 1910.
Id. at 1912.
Id. at 1913.
Davidson, supra note 1, at 430.
Id. (discussing the possibility of returning to a more formalistic approach).
See Renuart, supra note 5, at 139-40 (discussing the protection of lenders’ rights).
See Kaneshige, supra note 158, at 5.
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ensure the proper party is bringing the foreclosure complaint, by
allowing the establishment of chain of titles and assignments.202 When a
bank conducts a foreclosure under the safeguards and supervision of the
courts, this is more likely to prevent the financial institution from having
to return the home to the homeowner, post-foreclosure, as a result of
improper assignments/chain-of-titles or some other defect that may
result as a consequence of a non-judicial foreclosure.203
Judicial foreclosure proceedings are obviously more fair to
homeowners than non-judicial proceedings. Such a formal proceeding,
which moves slower than non-judicial foreclosures, provides the
homeowner with adequate time to seek legal assistance, even if from
free or reduced-fee services such as legal aid.204 This enables the
homeowner to fully investigate the foreclosure and documents to ensure
no defenses apply, such as fraud or chain-of-title issues that may arise
during a proceeding. Furthermore, by slowing the process down, the
system gives the homeowner a chance to obtain new or better
employment and a chance to negotiate for a possible settlement, possibly
resulting in the homeowner staying in the home and continuing to make
payments.205
Lastly, formal judicial proceedings are also beneficial to the local
communities. Formal proceedings allow people to remain in their homes
during the process, thereby reducing blight.206 If local judicial systems
are concerned about overloaded court dockets, these jurisdictions can
establish court rules limiting the amount of time a single foreclosure is
able to sit on the active docket: for example, one year.
2. Less Formal Standing Requirements
Second, while this comment has advocated for more formal
foreclosure proceedings, it also advocates for less-formal requirements
concerning real party-in-interest criteria. While recognizing the concerns
over the real party-in-interest, the courts will be able to ensure proper
party participation if conducted under a formal judicial proceeding.207
Such relaxed standards are necessary given the nature of today’s
202. Renuart, supra note 5, at 139-40 (stating that lenders must show title).
203. See Korngold, supra note 6, at 742-43 (discussing the courts’ attempts to determine
chain-of-title).
204. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1938-41; Renuart, supra note 5, at 173-74 (discussing the
problems associated with inadequate procedures).
205. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1953 (discussing the ability to modify loans).
206. Id. at 1909.
207. Renuart, supra note 5, at 173-74.
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securitization process and the consistent use of mortgage servicers. In
many cases, as seen above, the real party-in-interest has intended for
these nominees and servicers to bring foreclosure complaints, so courts
should allow them to bring the case.208
Certain procedures can be applied and required in order to
safeguard the relaxed party requirements. For example, jurisdictions
should require all assignments to be filled in, thus eliminating the use of
blank assignments.209 This will help establish and document the clear
chain of title. Furthermore, jurisdictions should require the physical
transfer of the original mortgage documents, including both the
promissory note and the mortgage document.210 Possession of these
documents will further prove that a party has an interest in the
promissory note or is at least the servicer or nominee of the mortgage
documents. This will also provide incentives for financial institutions
and their nominees/servicers to keep both the promissory note and
mortgage together, rather than split them up between different parties.211
However, the issue concerning whether a nominee should bring a
complaint is becoming less relevant because MERS no longer allows
parties to bring a complaint in its name, nor will MERS itself bring a
foreclosure complaint.212
However, this comment does advocate that courts should continue
to enforce rules such as the two-dismissal rule, whereby if a complaint is
dismissed twice, whether with prejudice or without prejudice, the
plaintiff is unable to bring the complaint a third time. 213 Such rules
equate to efficiency where the financial institutions will be forced to act
more diligently in ensuring they can prove their case. Furthermore, this
rule also encourages the banks to enter into settlement agreements that
will actually work for the homeowners, because if the settlement
agreement fails, it counts as one of the dismissals if it decides to re-file
the complaint.214

208. Phillips, supra note 170, at 263-64.
209. Id. at 262-63 (showing how only MERS keeps the record of transfers).
210. Steven, supra note 4, at 254; see also Phillips, supra note 170, at 263 (stating that
physical transfer helps to keep the documents from becoming separated).
211. Steven, supra note 4, at 254.
212. See MERS to Members: Don’t Foreclose in Our Name, HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 17, 2011,
1:05 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/mers-members-don%E2%80%99t-foreclose-ourname.
213. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Gullotta, 120 Ohio St. 3d 399, 2008-Ohio-6268, 899
N.E.2d 987, at ¶¶ 24-25.
214. See id. at ¶¶ 14-15
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3. Mandatory ADR
Third, and finally, this comment advocates for the mandatory use of
mediation or other similar ADR techniques. The use of mediation is
beneficial to all parties in an action for foreclosure. The banks benefit
for a few reasons. First, it allows them time to gather all necessary
documents to move forward with the case, in the event of trial, such as
obtaining the original mortgage and promissory note documents and
completing or establishing the proper chain of title for each document.215
Second, through a workout program with the homeowner, the financial
institution can prevent a loss suffered on a home, especially in a
declining population area, because the banks can at least receive some
sort of payment on the loan.216
Mediation programs are also very beneficial to homeowners for a
few different reasons, especially when the courts direct homeowners
towards free or reduced-fee legal services. First, the settlements usually
allow a homeowner to keep their home and make some sort of monthly
payment, usually less than the original principal amount.217 Such an
agreement is particularly useful for homeowners that went through a
brief stint of unemployment. However, in order for any sort of mediation
program to be effective, the foreclosure action needs to be removed from
the active docket to ensure the bank has a continued incentive to work
with the homeowner.218 Mediation can also be very useful for
communities because, once again, homeowners will be kept in their
homes during the mediation process, thus preventing abandoned homes
from being scattered around the community.219
After reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of various
jurisdictions and their rules and regulations, one can easily see that
certain procedural techniques should be favored over others. This
suggested process is the most fair, efficient, and effective procedure to
conduct a foreclosure procedure.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is no secret that the financial collapse of recent years has put this
country into a poor economic environment. Unfortunately, this
environment has helped lead to a major mortgage problem in this
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1941-42 (discussing the discovery of documents).
Id. at 1894.
Id. at 1895.
Id. at 1924.
Id. at 1909.
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country whereby many Americans are unable to make payments, thus
going into foreclosure.220 Given an analysis of many jurisdictions and
the confusion among rulings, many judicial districts were unprepared
and blind-sided by such a problem—a problem of massive amounts of
foreclosures.221
The entire fix of the economic market may very well depend on
how the rules of mortgages and foreclosures change and transform.222
Therefore, as courts and legislatures continue to fix the system and
create new laws to prevent future and further fallout from occurring, it is
up to legal scholars to determine the best possible routes for turning this
archaic security law into a more modern system.223 The debate and study
of the various possible routes, both with the securitization process and
the foreclosure process, could very well determine the future success of
the economy around the world.

220. Davidson, supra note 1, at 391.
221. Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1906.
222. See Kurt Eggert, Not Dead Yet: The Surprising Survival of Negotiability, 66 ARK. L. REV.
145, 147-68 (2013) (discussing how the failure to fix the securitization market now creates a
substantial risk for the parties that enter into the securitization loan market).
223. Hunt, supra note 173, at 1530.
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